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ABSTRACT Over the past decade, focus on the security and privacy aspects of implantable medical
devices (IMDs) has intensified, driven by the multitude of cybersecurity vulnerabilities found in various
existing devices. However, due to their strict computational, energy and physical constraints, conventional
security protocols are not directly applicable to IMDs. Custom-tailored schemes have been proposed instead
which, however, fail to cover the full spectrum of security features that modern IMDs and their ecosystems so
critically require. In this paper we propose IMDfence, a security protocol for IMD ecosystems that provides a
comprehensive yet practical security portfolio, which includes availability, non-repudiation, access control,
entity authentication, remote monitoring and system scalability. The protocol also allows emergency access
that results in the graceful degradation of offered services without compromising security and patient safety.
The performance of the security protocol as well as its feasibility and impact onmodern IMDs are extensively
analyzed and evaluated. We find that IMDfence achieves the above security requirements at a mere less than
7% increase in total IMD energy consumption, and less than 14 ms and 9 kB increase in system delay and
memory footprint, respectively.
INDEX TERMS Authentication protocol, battery-depletion attack, battery DoS, denial-of-service attack,
IMD, implantable medical device, non-repudiation, smart card, zero-power defense.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern implantable medical devices (IMDs), such as cardiac
pacemakers and defibrillators, neurostimulators, and more,
are equipped with wireless connectivity in order to aid in
treatment-related reconfiguration, patient-health monitoring,
device testing etc. [1], [2]. However, wireless links have
made IMDs susceptible to various attacks by malicious
entities.
Earlier-generation IMDs had little or no security provisions
whatsoever, as confirmed by numerous ethical-hacking inci-
dents over the past decade [3]–[5]. The research community
has responded with a wealth of new schemes and, eventually,
top IMD manufacturers now claim to have rectified the
security weaknesses over the past few years [6], [7].
However, due to the constraints imposed by an IMD’s
scant computational, storage and energy resources, most
proposed schemes in research have refrained from taking
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proven security approaches. Moreover, since these schemes
have been specifically tailored for IMDs, they have missed
the big picture and resulted in limited coverage of the security
properties essential to a modern IMD. Specifically, most
focus has been drawn on confidentiality, integrity, authen-
tication and emergency access (e.g., [8]–[11] etc.), while
non-repudiation, remote monitoring and system scalability
have been left unaddressed for the most part. Besides being
difficult to tackle, prior seminal work has not identified or
stressed the importance of these additional requirements.
In this paper, we debunk the myth that advanced security
is impossible in modern IMDs. To this end, we collect
both well-studied and overlooked security requirements,
impose strict design constraints, and propose IMDfence,
a novel security protocol for IMD ecosystems. This works
contributes:
• A comprehensive security protocol for a modern IMD
ecosystem, IMDfence, which addresses crucial, yet
previously ignored requirements, i.e., non-repudiation,
remote monitoring and system scalability.
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• A realistic solution for accessing the IMD during
emergencies without compromising security or patient
safety.
• A rigorous evaluation of IMDfence paying special atten-
tion to the protection against battery denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:We enumerate
modern IMD-system requirements in Section II, and then
discuss existing systems and related works in Sections III
and IV, respectively. Section V details our proposed security
protocol. We evaluate IMDfence in Section VI and provide
concluding remarks in Section VII.
II. IMD-SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we collect and present the necessary security
and related functional requirements that should be satisfied
in modern IMD systems. These requirements form the basis
of the IMD-specific security protocol, to be detailed in
Section V.
In order to evaluate the IMD-system security, we consider
an implant that is capable of communicating wirelessly with a
reader/programmer.1We assume an attacker whose aim could
be to either (1) modify or sabotage IMD operation in order
to prevent patient treatment, (2) manipulate patient-related
data, or (3) steal patient data. Furthermore, we assume that
the attacker has full control of the wireless channel between
the reader and IMD. This means that he/she can eavesdrop,
modify, insert, block or replay messages between these two
entities at will. As a result, the IMD-security system has to
satisfy certain security requirements (SRs):
A. BASIC SECURITY SERVICES (SR1 & SR2)
As in other domains, the IMD-security system should provide
the fundamental security services: Confidentiality, Integrity
and Availability. The first two services (SR1) are usually
addressed through the use of lightweight block-ciphers and
message-authentication codes (MAC) [12]. More specifi-
cally, the commands sent from the reader to the IMD and
the associated responses (e.g., data logs) should be treated
as confidential and it should be ensured that such data is not
modified in transit.
Availability ensures that the IMD is always available for
patient treatment whenever required (SR2). This implies that
the device should be protected against Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attacks. One of the highest-likelihood and lowest-cost
attacks is the battery-depletion attack (or battery DoS attack),
as indicated in the IMD-specific threat-modeling analysis
in [1] and practically demonstrated in [3], [4].
B. NON-REPUDIATION (SR3)
Non-repudiation ensures that the sender of a message is
not able to deny (or repudiate) its creation. Since there
is always a possibility of malpractices, medical mistakes
1The term reader will be used for any device that is able to directly
communicate with the implant.
or insider attacks, we require non-repudiation to aid in
computer forensics in case a patient experiences medical
issues as a direct consequence of such actions. This security
service ensures that a physician, paramedic or nurse is
not able to deny his/her involvement in such scenarios.
Non-repudiation has not been given due consideration by
the research community when it comes to IMD systems.
One of the reasons is that true non-repudiation can only
be achieved through the use of public-key (or asymmetric)
cryptography for computing digital signatures [13], which
has traditionally been considered to be too resource-costly for
IMDs [12], [14]. Another, very important, reason is that past
generations of IMDs could only be accessed by one person,
i.e., the physician. Nowadays, the IMDs can be accessed by
multiple people, including the patients themselves [15]–[17].
Hence, there is a need to introduce user accountability.
Most of the existing IMD-security works have looked into
strict reader-IMD communication (without the involvement
of a trusted third party). Even if we assume that the
resource-constrained IMD is able to support public-key com-
putations, this reader-IMD configuration makes it impossible
for the IMD to effectively use public-key cryptography since
it cannot keep track of the validity of the reader certificates
(due to lack of Internet connectivity). What is more, these
devices do not have sufficient memory to store the required
certificates [18]. For instance, the IMDmust store all possible
reader certificates if we want to support access during travels
or when the patient is visiting abroad. Hence, a scheme is
required that employs additional architectural components
(as will be discussed in Section V) to solve these issues.
Another complication is the legal aspect. Since non-
repudiation is there to provide evidence, it should be
incorporated based on the assumption that such evidence
will be scrutinized by a hostile legal expert [19]. One
main limitation of cryptography-based non-repudiation is
that there is no formally-verifiable link between the device
that signs the digital signature and its user. For example,
the user, i.e., the private-key owner, can falsely claim that the
signature has been generated by a malware program without
his/her consent, or that the private key has been stolen. There
is no technical mechanism that can determine whether such a
claim is false [20]. The IMD security protocol should address
this limitation, which we term as the Non-repudiation gap.
C. EMERGENCY ACCESS (SR4)
Patient safety always outweighs device security. Hence,
during emergencies the security protocol should not hinder
or delay paramedic access to the IMD [2], [21]. Although
it seems reasonable to drop security altogether in such
situations, this can be a problem if, while in a normal
mode, an adversary fools the IMD into entering the
emergency-access mode. The security protocol must be
capable of allowing the IMD to accurately classify whether a
communication attempt is an emergency or a normal access.
This ensures that the adversary is unable to trigger and
exploit the emergency-access mode. Furthermore, since there
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is a high likelihood of the patient losing control of his/her
actions in emergencies, the emergency-access mode should
be independent of patient participation.
D. MULTI-MANUFACTURER ENVIRONMENT (SR5)
Past works on emergency access have ignored the fact
that, in emergencies, it is unlikely for the paramedic to
know the IMD make and model beforehand. Moreover,
it is not possible to preemptively stock all the readers from
all the manufacturers in the ambulance. Hence, to achieve
true emergency access, the IMD-security system should be
manufacturer-independent, i.e., all manufacturers need to
agree on a unified standard for secure reader-IMD commu-
nication. This way, an ambulance can use one generic reader
regardless of the IMD manufacturer and type. It follows
that an emergency-access scheme should be adoptable by all
IMD types. E.g., an emergency-access solution that requires
an IMD measuring the cardiac signal [21], can be easily
incorporated in pacemakers, but it will require significant
modifications in neurostimulators.
As things stand, true emergency access does not exist in
commercial IMDs. As long as this remains acceptable to
the medical community, SR5 can be relaxed. This is further
discussed in Section V-D2.
E. ACCESS CONTROL (SR6)
The access privileges of the reader should be differentiated
based on the type of user. For example, nurses, patients or
patient relatives may only be allowed to read status data
from the implant, whereas a physician and a paramedic
may further be allowed to modify the implant configuration
for therapy updates, suspend or resume its operation.
Similarly, a technician may be allowed to modify the
implant firmware in addition to tasks of the above user
roles.
F. USER AND READER-IMD AUTHENTICATION (SR7)
In order to aid in non-repudiation and access control, the IMD
system should be able to identify the physician, nurse,
paramedic etc. who is using the reader to communicate with
the implant. Similarly, the reader should also be able to
authenticate the IMD in order to prevent spoofing attacks
on the reader. Hence, there is a requirement for performing
mutual authentication instead of just authenticating the reader
unilaterally [12]. Furthermore, said authentication is required
to be strong, i.e., it should imply both message and entity
authentication, and guarantee message freshness, or in other
words replay protection.
G. FLEXIBILITY AND SCALABILITY (SR8)
The IMD should not be limited to communicating with only a
fixed amount of readers since this severely limits portability,
e.g., during emergencies when a paramedic reader is used,
or when there is a need for treatment at some hospital during
travels. Hence, there should not be any pre-shared secrets
between the reader and IMD.
H. BEDSIDE-READER OPERATION FOR REMOTE
MONITORING (SR9)
Some of the modern IMD systems also include a bedside
reader, which enables remote monitoring [22]. It establishes
communication with the IMD when the patient is asleep
and sends treatment status to a back-end server via an
Internet connection. However, this additional connection
represents an increase in the attack surface, which imposes
additional security requirements. We predict that the use of
such readers will become more widespread over time due to
their time- and cost-saving features. Hence, this phenomenon
should proactively be considered when designing secure IMD
systems.
III. EXISTING SYSTEMS
IMD manufacturers have typically relied on ‘‘security
through obscurity’’; they choose to hide the communication-
protocol specifications in order to enhance security. This
is not a recommended practice, and as a consequence
of using this approach, we have seen several successful
blackbox-hacking attempts over the past few years [3], [4].
Some of the latest commercial IMDs, including neu-
rostimulators [17], insertable cardiac monitors [16] and
even pacemakers [15] offer a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
connection between the patient smart-phone and the implant.
The initial pairing between these devices is based on the BLE
standard in addition to proprietary protocols [17]. However,
they do not disclose the association models used in these
pairings, which makes these devices vulnerable to attacks
due to the reasons mentioned above. In most of the cardiac
devices, in the absence of an IMD-programmer, a magnet
can be used to disable therapy or to switch to a default
behavior [23]. This mode, however, can be easily exploited
by adversaries through the use of a strong magnet when in
close proximity to the patient (e.g., in public transport).
IV. RELATED WORK
From the perspective of the research community, we observe
a steep rise in the number of works proposed over the last
few years [31]. For data confidentiality, integrity andmessage
authentication, the use of lightweight primitives has been
proposed. Early works focused on basic security protocols
based on symmetric ciphers, which rely on a common
pre-shared key between the reader and the IMD [12].
However, such approaches are not scalable in terms of adding
new readers that can access the implant. They also do
not allow paramedic access during emergencies. Therefore,
most of the existing works deal with emergency access,
in addition to entity authentication and key exchange. For
entity authentication, these works rely on a touch-to-access
policy, which ensures that only the entities that can physically
touch the patient for a prolonged period of time are allowed
access to the implant [1], [21]. In other words, it is infeasible
for an attacker to get in close proximity to the patient, and
even if that is the case, the patient can detect this and reject
physical contact. Also, the attacker would then have far easier
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TABLE 1. Overview of related works.
methods to harm the patient than via accessing the implant,
e.g., by physically attacking the patient. These works can be
broadly categorized as follows [2]:
Biometric-based: These approaches (such as [21], [32])
rely on both the reader and IMD to measure a physiological
signal from different parts of the patient’s body. The devices
are paired based on the similarity of these measurements.
Proxy-based: These works propose to use an additional
device in the possession of the patient, such as a smart phone,
watch, etc [33], [34]. The device is paired with the IMD and is
used to authenticate the reader that is trying to communicate
with the implant. In case of emergency, the device can be
physically distanced from the patient in order to grant the
reader unsecured access to the IMD.
Distance-based: These works (e.g., [35], [36]) employ
weak or out-of-band (OOB) signals for reader-IMD commu-
nication. These can either involve direct transfer of a session
key, which would be hard for an attacker to eavesdrop, or they
can require the devices to mutually prove proximity to one
another.
Token-based: This is the simplest approach, which relies
on the patients having the IMD-access key or password
with them, which is stored e.g., on a bracelet. During an
emergency, a paramedic can access the IMD using this token.
We now present a brief overview of the latest works from
literature that were specifically tailored for IMDs.
Bu et al. propose a low-energy IMD-security scheme called
Bulwark [8], which, in addition to satisfying SR1, also allows
IMD access in emergencies (SR4). This emergency access
scheme is based on Shamir’s secret sharing, which relies
on the users (including the paramedics) to register with the
manufacturer of the specific IMD in advance in order to
retrieve the access key in case of an emergency. As evident,
such a requirement inhibits IMD access in case the patient is
out of town (SR8).
Chi et al. [10] propose a protocol that relies on the patient’s
smartphone for the reader access. However, requiring the
patient to be in possession of this additional device (i.e.,
the smartphone) all the time, including during emergencies,
puts a significant burden on the patient.
Belkhouja et al. [11] propose a symmetric crypto system
in which they use a Chaotic key generator that is employed
by both the reader and IMD to generate the symmetric
key. However, in order for this key generator to work,
both entities are required to have similar pre-installed initial
conditions/values. Hence, this scheme cannot function in an
emergency scenario, or when the patient is traveling, since
the IMD and the reader will not be sharing the same initial
conditions.
Wazid et al. [24] and Mao et al. [25] propose three-factor
protocols, which rely on passwords, smart cards, and
biometrics. Their protocols rely on a reader-registration phase
before the IMD deployment in the field. This inhibits SR4
and SR8 since it is unlikely for the paramedic/doctor to
possess a pre-registered reader during an emergency or when
the patient is visiting abroad. Rathore et al. [26] propose a
scheme in which the identifiers of each user (including the
patient) are derived from their cardiac signals and are stored
in the implant. Hence, it requires a user-registration phase
similar to the above protocols. However, their scheme allows
emergency access since the paramedic can measure patient’s
cardiac signal, which is compared by the IMD against the
stored identifier in order to grant access. The three-factor
protocol from Fu et al. [27] also provides emergency access.
However, the patient is required to always be in possession of
a personal smart card so that the paramedic is able to use it
during an emergency.
A few works [3], [12], [28] have also focused on the IMD
availability (SR2). In these works, RF energy harvesting
is employed to protect the IMD against battery-depletion
attacks. In addition, quite a few authentication and
emergency-access schemes have been proposed recently
that rely on static biometrics (such as fingerprints) [37],
dynamic biometrics (such as cardiac signals) [28], [29] and
combination of both [9]. The interested reader can refer
to [31], [38]–[41] to get an overview of prior works in this
area.
Overall, the above works address only parts of the
IMD security requirements (SR1, SR2, SR4, SR6, SR7
and SR8), which is also summarized in Table 1. For
instance, non-repudiation is not considered and the
emergency-access schemes do not take into account
the (current) multi-manufacturer environment, as discussed in
Section II. To the best of our knowledge, there is no protocol
that provides all the services highlighted in Section II.
The work from literature that came closest to fulfilling the
above requirements was proposed by Park [30]. It establishes
a session key between the IMD and a personalized reader
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based on shared secrets between these entities and a trusted
third party (hospital server). The use of public-key crypto
in the personalized reader and the server facilitates non-
repudiation. However, the work lacks a few additional pieces
in order to properly close the non-repudiation gap (as will be
discussed in Section V-C5). The protocol addresses access
control by first allowing only read access to the implant
via the server. Based on the result of the read-out data,
the server provides write keys to the reader-IMD pair which
allows the user to change IMD settings. The personalization
process involves the physician inserting a personal smart card
into the reader. However, since it resembles a single-factor
authentication for the user (i.e., through the use of a smart
card without PIN), any person in possession of a valid (stolen)
card can access the implant by getting hold of a reader. The
server maintains a list of primary-care physicians authorized
to access each registered implant. If the physician is a
member of this list, then a read-key is granted to the
physician. We believe that maintaining such a user list is
not scalable, it inhibits flexibility, and hence, should not be
employed. As an example, such a scheme will not work
in case the patient requires some treatment at a hospital
abroad. Besides, the proposed emergency-access scheme uses
a bracelet that has a secret key. However, such token-based
security schemes are single points of failure (e.g., in case
the token is stolen or the contents are disclosed). Also,
it requires the patient to wear the bracelet at all times,
which is inconvenient. Moreover, in the emergency scenario,
the scheme drops access control and non-repudiation. Lastly,
this work excludes battery DoS from its adversarial model,
and it does not consider bedside-reader operation.
V. IMDfence: SECURITY PROTOCOL FOR IMD
ECOSYSTEMS
The absence of a complete security solution for IMD
systems has led us to propose IMDfence, a novel
secure-communication protocol that satisfies the extensive
and strict requirements enumerated in Section II. As will be
shown, IMDfence addresses the complete IMD ecosystem.
FIGURE 1. Proposed IMD ecosystem.
A. CONFIGURATION AND ASSUMPTIONS
The IMDfence configuration includes a smart card (C) for
the user (U ) trying to access the IMD (e.g., a physician),
TABLE 2. Table of Notations.
and a trusted third party (TTP), i.e., a hospital server (S),
in addition to the implant (I ) and the reader (R); see Fig. 1.
The list of notations used in this paper is summarized
in Table 2. The extra components, C and S, are employed
to facilitate non-repudiation (SR3), access control (SR6)
and user authentication (SR7), as identified in Section II.
Each personal smart card, which is inserted in R, supports
public-key cryptography. Its private key, which is unique to
each card/user, enables digital-signature computation, thus
providing non-repudiation. Since R and C are untrusted with
respect to each other, a TTP (S) is required to mutually
authenticate the two entities. Non-repudiation can technically
also be provided through the use of a personal reader that
supports public-key computations in order to get rid of C
and S. However, such a solution would be highly impractical
and expensive since it would require all the doctors and
nurses to be in possession of their personal readers at all
times. Moreover, the use of S also enables access control
and facilitates bedside-reader operation (SR9). Every user
requires their own C and should know the associated PIN
(two-factor authentication). Since patients are only allowed
read-only access (as discussed in Section II-E), losing or
misplacing their C will not inhibit any future treatment. To
avoid additional attack vectors, we propose to not support the
use of contactless smart cards and magnetic-strip cards.
1) INTERFACES
For tackling flexibility and scalability (SR8), there is no
pre-shared key between R↔ I , R↔ C , S ↔ R, and C ↔ I .
The only pre-shared symmetric keys that exist are between
S ↔ I (KSI ) and S ↔ C (KSC ). A unique KSI is installed
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in the implant at the time of manufacturing, which is then
shared with the server of the hospital where the implantation
surgery is going to take place. During this IMD-registration
process, the implant is also assigned a unique and random
identifier IDI , which is stored in the implant. Likewise, KSC
is installed in the smart card and is shared with the hospital
where the card user is registered. Moreover, S, I and C can
only talk to R directly and only indirectly with each other.2
The secure communication between S ↔ R is made
possible by employing public-key-based key exchange in
which the public/private key pairs of these entities are used.
This configuration helps in making R independent of the need
to pre-share keys with the hospital, which aids in scalability.
As a result, a patient can use his/her personal reader from
any location, and/or buy a new reader from the manufacturer
without the need of registering it first at the hospital.
In our proposed configuration, each smart card also has
its own public/private key pair. Technically, R has the capa-
bility of maintaining a comprehensive certificate-revocation
list (CRL) of smart cards due to frequent Internet connec-
tivity. Hence, it is able to verify smart-card certificates. On
the other hand, due to the limited on-board memory and
less-frequent Internet connectivity, C can only maintain a
small CRL that does not change frequently. Hence, C can not
verify the authenticity of the multitude of reader certificates.
As a result, public-key-based key exchange cannot be used
to establish a session key between R↔ C . However, it will
be shown in Section V-C that the session key between R↔
C will be established using S as a TTP. The same will be
done for establishing a session key between R ↔ I . Lastly,
no session key is required between C ↔ I .
2) CENTRALIZATION AND PUBLIC-KEY INFRASTRUCTURE
The public keys of S, R and C are signed by a trusted
certification authority (CA) belonging to the manufacturer.
The smart-card certificates, in addition, also include the user
privileges.
We consider the precise implementation details of
public-key infrastructure (PKI) and certificate revocation
outside the scope of this paper. In case of a smart card,
certificate revocation would be needed when a card is stolen,
a user leaves, or he/she changes roles (e.g., from nurse to
paramedic). For a reader, certificate revocation would be
required in case R is stolen or deemed as out-of-service. The
server is given the responsibility to verify the certificates of R
and C and hence, it is assumed that it maintains an up-to-date
CRL.
3) MODES OF OPERATION
We propose two modes of operating in IMDfence, one for
regular (online) operation and the other in the absence of an
active Internet connection (offline), e.g., during emergencies
(SR4); see Fig. 2. Online mode offers the full security- and
2The routing details of the messages communicated via the reader have
been omitted for brevity.
functional-requirement portfolio highlighted in Section II,
whereas offline mode results in the graceful degradation of
offered services without compromising security and patient
safety. Since S is not available in offline mode, R and I will
be required to undergo an out-of-band (OOB) pairing phase
in order to securely exchange a short-term session key. These
modes and the constituent phases will be elaborated in the
following sections.
FIGURE 2. IMDfence flow under online and offline scenarios.
B. THREAT MODEL
As discussed in Section II, we assume an attacker A that
has full control of the wireless channel between R and I .
R is assumed to be untrustworthy by I , C and S, and vice
versa. Moreover, we assume that if A steals a personal
smart card or a valid reader, then the user or hospital staff
should notify the hospital server so that it is blacklisted.
Additionally, we assume that A can hack the reader to read
out or modify data at the interface of the inserted smart
card. However, A does not have access to the keys stored in
R and C . This implies that protection against side-channel
attacks is considered outside the scope of this work since
such attacks are typically addressed through specialized
countermeasures. Moreover, due to the assumption that S is
notified of a lost/stolen device, A has a limited time window
to perform such attacks after stealing a device. We also
assume that the hospital personal do not have access to the
keys stored in the server since such attacks can be prevented
by employing standard practices, such as hardware security
modules (HSM) etc.
C. REGULAR (ONLINE) MODE
The regular mode of IMDfence is shown in Figures 3 to 6. It
starts with the R↔ C mutual authentication phase after the
physician (or any other user) inserts their smart card into the
reader.
1) R↔ C MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
In this phase, R first tries to establish a secure connection
with S by sending its identifier and a nonce (which is a
freshly generated number that is used only once). In order
to deter distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against
S (to ensure server availability (SR2)), a basic client-puzzle
protocol (CPP) is employed [42]. CPP is a proof-of-work
system in which any client (or in this case a reader) that
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FIGURE 3. Reader-card authentication. Steps that are common with
bedside-reader mode are marked in blue.
wants to access the server (during high load) is required to
correctly solve a cryptographic puzzle. For a single client the
costs of solving this puzzle are negligible. However, in order
to launch a successful DDoS by initiating a large number
of simultaneous connections, it would be computationally
infeasible for the attacker to solve amultitude of such puzzles.
S initiates CPP if it senses a DDoS attack or it is
dealing with an abnormally high number of simultaneous
connections. It first calculates x, which is the n-bit hash
of IDR, the current time stamp t and its long-term secret KS .
It then computes a second hash (h(x)). S sends h(x) and x
excluding the first k bits of x, along with the t . R computes the
solution, i.e., the missing k bits of x, and sends it along with
IDR and the received time stamp. k represents the difficulty
of solving the puzzle. S calculates x again and verifies that
the solution indeed corresponds to the missing bits. It also
verifies, with the help of t , that the puzzle has not expired. S is
protected against memory exhaustion since it is not required
to store any data for the verification of the puzzle solution. In
case these checks are successful, S sends its nonce to R.
R then performs a Diffie–Hellman (DH)-based handshake
with S in which a session key is established between them
based on their public/private key pairs (see Fig. 3). During
this handshake, both verify each other’s certificates and,
additionally, S checks if R is valid (i.e., it is not reported as
stolen or out-of-service).
In order to achieve authentication between R and C , R then
initiates a five-pass, mutual-authentication protocol borrowed
from the ISO/IEC 9798-2 standard [43] with S acting as
a TTP (see Fig. 3). R and C ensure message freshness
by exchanging their nonces in the first messages between
them, and then verifying the existence of these nonces in
the subsequent messages. R generates its nonce and sends
it along with its identifier and NS to C . C responds by
generatingNC and sending a cryptogram (mSC1 ) that includes
authenticated encryption of its certificate, IDR and nonces,
along with IDC and NC in plaintext. This cryptogram is
calculated using KSC since it is intended for the server. R
stores IDC andNC , and forwards the cryptogram to the server,
which establishes that it originated from C and that it is
also tied to R. The server then verifies CertC and checks
the validity of C , in case it has been reported stolen or
has expired. It then determines the required privileges (PC )
for the particular user (e.g., physician, paramedic, nurse
etc) from CertC . It also calculates tokens for both these
entities using the respective symmetric keys. These tokens
include the nonces and identifiers of R and C and a fresh
symmetric key K ′RC . Additionally, tokenR also contains T
(reader-card-authentication lifetime). Based on these tokens,
R and C can ascertain each other’s trustworthiness.
R decrypts tokenR, retrieves K ′RC , calculates the MAC of
the nonces, and forwards it along with tokenC toC . The smart
card similarly decrypts tokenC and verifies the receivedMAC
using K ′RC . It stores the nonces and K ′RC in its internal flash
memory3 so that it can verify and create messages in the
subsequent stages. C then sends a MAC that is calculated
over NR and NC (including an addition by 1 to protect against
replay of the previous message). R verifies the received
MAC using K ′RC . At this point, both R and C have mutually
authenticated each other.
R then sets its internal real-time clock to T and starts it
to track the period over which the subsequent phases can
execute without the need of reader-card authentication. Since
it is possible that R is not connected to the Internet during its
operation (e.g., in emergencies), this scheme enforces that R,
by design, shall only be usable for a certain duration until it
3There can be a time gap between this and the next stage (in offline mode).
Since smart cards can only be powered by R, the above data has to be stored
in the non-volatile (flash) memory so that C can be taken out of R during this
period.
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has first established an Internet connection. This makes sure
that R receives critical firmware updates in time, if there are
any. The selection and configuration of T will be discussed
in Section VI-A4.
FIGURE 4. User authentication at the reader.
2) USER AUTHENTICATION
This phase is shown in Fig. 4 and its objective is to
authenticate the card holder. The physician enters his/her
PIN using a keypad on the reader. R then checks its internal
real-time clock to verify the validity of its token. R encrypts
the PIN and the nonces (in order to prevent replays) using
K ′RC . C decrypts the message using the same key, verifies the
PIN by comparing it with the stored one and sends back a
cryptogram intended for the server, which is encrypted with
KSC . It contains the confirmation of success in addition to the
nonces.
3) SESSION-KEY (K ′RI) ESTABLISHMENT
R then initiates a TTP-based key established protocol with
S and I in order to acquire a symmetric session key K ′RI
for providing confidentiality and integrity (SR1), as shown
in Fig. 5. R first exchanges the nonces and identifiers with I
and then sends the nonces and identifiers of all parties to S
along with mSC2 . S first verifies mSC2 . It then generates K
′
RI ,
encrypts it in two independent messages mR and mI intended
for R and I respectively, and then sends these to R. R decrypts
mR and verifies its contents. It then encrypts NR and NI using
K ′RI (to form mRI ) and then sends it along with mI to I . I
first retrieves K ′RI by decryptingmI , and then decryptsmRI to
verify that R has the knowledge of K ′RI and that the nonces
are valid. I finally creates a MAC using the new session
key for R to validate. At the end of this protocol, both R
and I are mutually authenticated (SR7) and have arrived at a
fresh session key in addition to performing key confirmation.
Similar to the reader-card authentication stage, this phase is
also based on the five-pass protocol from ISO/IEC 9798-2
since it involves a TTP.
To protect against battery-DoS attacks (which impact
availability (SR2)), steps 1 to 4 of session-key establishment
should be as lightweight as possible so that the IMD is able
to execute it using harvested RF energy. This will be further
discussed in Section VI-B.
FIGURE 5. Session-key establishment between R and I via S. Operations
that are not relevant to bedside-reader mode are marked in orange.
4) MAIN PHASE
After session-key establishment, R allows the user to enter a
command on the reader interface (see Fig. 6). The command
is encrypted along with the nonces (to prevent replay attacks)
using K ′RC and is sent to C . The card decrypts the command,
digitally signs the message usingKprC (to form sig) and sends
it to R. R re-encrypts the command using K ′RI and sends it to
the implant along with sig.
I decrypts the command and verifies if it corresponds to
the privileges information received in mI during the previous
phase, hence ensuring access control. sig and CMD are
FIGURE 6. Main phase. Steps that are common with bedside-reader
mode are marked in blue. Operations that are unique to bedside-reader
mode are marked in green.
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stored by the IMD next to IDC , NC and NR, which were
stored during session-key establishment. This is required
to ensure non-repudiation since sig was signed using a
personal private key. For example, in the case of a medical
mistake (e.g., an incorrect command) that led to patient death,
the physician will not be able to deny his/her involvement
since this signature can always be retrieved from the IMD and
subsequently verified using the associated data. It follows that
signature storage is not required for read-only commands.
Since the implant trusts the reader at this point, there is
no need for I to verify the signature since the associated
MAC has already been verified by R. This relieves I of
the need to employ public-key cryptography and to track
user certificates. After processing the command, the implant
responds with an answer message encrypted with K ′RI . R
displays it on its screen for the convenience of the user. The
session keys expire after a finish command and its associated
response, or after a period T .
5) ADDRESSING THE NON-REPUDIATION GAP
As discussed in Section II, the use of a signature alone is not
sufficient to address the legal aspects of non-repudiation. In
order to bridge the non-repudiation gap, one option could be
to enforce that the user protects C and the associated PIN,
or immediately reports in case it is lost. However, due to the
possibility of human error in general, this is too much of a
legal responsibility for the user.
A realistic way of bridging this gap is by introduc-
ing additional checks in the implementation of reader-
card-authentication and session-key-establishment phases
(see Figures 3 and 5, respectively). The server can ensure that
the implant write access (determined from PC ) is requested
from within the hospital network and during the working
hours of the user. On the other hand, the server can allow read-
only accesses from external networks, e.g., in case the access
is made by the patient or their bedside reader. The user just
has to ensure that R is issued from a certified repository, and
that R should only be connected to a trusted Ethernet/Wi-Fi
network (i.e., in a hospital or patient home). With these
precautions, which a responsible user can easily follow,
protection can be ensured against the malicious replacement
of a command using a compromised reader, or against an
attacker sending a malicious command him/herself in order
to frame said user. Due to the above risk-based, multi-factor
authentication, a user cannot falsely deny his/her involvement
in a certain implant access because the alternative explanation
implies that (1) the attacker stole a valid reader, card and
pin, (2) accessed the implant from within the hospital and
during the user’s working hours, and (3) R and C were not
reported as stolen. The combined probabilities of all these
events occurring at once is extremely small, or, in other
words, the non-repudiation gap is effectively bridged by the
introduction of above checks.
6) BEDSIDE-READER OPERATION
The online mode also facilitates bedside-reader operation
(see Fig. 1). Here, only the CPP and DH-based handshake
between the bedside R and S (from reader-card authentication
phase), the session-key establishment phase, and the main
phase (with a few differences, as indicated in Fig. 5
and Fig. 6, respectively) need to be executed, since the
commands and responses are only sent and read by S.
Moreover, since the remote monitoring done in practice
is only read only, i.e., with the lowest access privileges,
there is no need for non-repudiation if the read-only access
control is implemented correctly. This can be done if sig
in step 6 is replaced by MAC of CMD from S (i.e.,
MACKSI (CMD,NR,NI )). Using this MAC, I is able to verify
that the command came from the server, and hence, it can be
executed with read-only privileges. Finally, the hospital staff
can retrieve the critical treatment data by logging into S. It
can be argued that this remote-access mode should support
read/write access instead of just read-only in order to enable
remote firmware updates. However, we stress that such
updates should always occur in the presence of a qualified
professional. This is important in case patient health suddenly
deteriorates due to the update process. Moreover, in practice
it is quite common and acceptable to get the IMD firmwares
updated at the clinic in the presence of a physician [7].
This mode is also useful for securely retrieving the stored
signatures pertaining to previous programming sessions in
order to free up limited IMD memory.
7) IMD ACCESS FROM A NON-LOCAL LOCATION
In Section V-A1, we discussed that C and I are registered
at the local hospital (SL), or in other words, they share their
respective symmetric keys with the hospital server. During
travels or when the patient is out of town, a situation may
arise that requires access to the IMD for status monitoring.
In this case, the scheme from Fig. 1, can still work if the
patient is in possession of R and his/her C . However, for
treatment updates, which require higher access privileges,
the patient would need to visit a nearby (remote) hospital (SR).
In this case, the above scheme would not work straightaway
since the IMD is not registered at SR and the remote-location
physician’sC is not registered at SL . Hence, minor extensions
are required (see Fig. 7), in which SR establishes a secure
connection with SL via an IMD-manufacturer server SM . SM
maintains a list of all the IMDs in service and the hospitals
at which they are registered. Based on IDI sent by R to SR
(and then SR to SM ) during the session-key establishment
phase (see Fig. 5), SM determines SL and establishes a secure
connection with it. SR sends K ′RI , the relevant identifiers,
nonces and PC to SL (via SM ) so that SL is able to
construct mI and send it back to SR. The protocol then
proceeds normally and the IMD eventually retrievesK ′RI after
decrypting mI .
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FIGURE 7. Scenario when the patient is out of town.
D. OFFLINE MODE
In the absence of an active Internet connection and hence,
the TTP (S), e.g., during emergencies, R and I need to
establish a temporary shared key so that they can commu-
nicate directly in a secure manner. We propose to employ an
OOB-channel-based key exchange while using the principle
of touch-to-access (as discussed in Section IV). This principle
is employed by I to establish trust with R since we assume
R to be untrustworthy from the perspective of the IMD. We
propose to either use ultrasound communication or galvanic
coupling as the OOB channel (between R and I ) since they
result in virtually zero information leakage compared to
other coupling methods, such as capacitive coupling [44].
Moreover, they have an advantage over biometric-based
touch-to-access mechanisms (mentioned in Section IV) in
that they do not require any initial RF communication
messages before the IMD is sure that the external entity is
in close proximity. This provides an additional security layer,
which is critical for the pre-deployment configuration that
will be discussed in Section V-D1.
Assuming that galvanic coupling is used, the paramedic
places the OOB interface of the reader on the patient skin4
at a point that is nearest to the IMD. The patient is assumed
to thwart advances of a stranger trying to place a reader on
his/her skin, if there is no emergency or a need for treatment.
Hence, the implant assumes that the message received from
the OOB interface is from a trustworthy source. In other
words, in offline mode, the IMD-system security hinges on
this OOB pairing and favors availability over security but in
a more controlled fashion than state of the art.
The protocol is shown in Fig. 8. The paramedic is required
to perform reader-card authentication when starting his/her
duty, so that both R and C obtain their respective tokens
from S. When IMD access is required in an offline setting,
R first initiates user authentication with the paramedic smart
card in the same way as in the regular mode. During user
authentication, R verifies that its internal real-time-clock
value is less than T . Through the OOB channel, R sends
a request for offline access along with its identifier. Upon
receiving this request, the implant assumes that this is an
offline scenario since this channel is activated only in such
extraordinary circumstances. As a result, it generates a
4Touching the skin is mandatory for the galvanic channel to function.
FIGURE 8. IMDfence (Offline mode).
random key K ′RI and its nonce and sends them along with IDI
to the reader using the same channel.
R, then, initiates session-key confirmation with I in which
both entities verify each other’s MACs that are generated
using K ′RI . In order to update or inquire about the implant
operation, the paramedic enters the command on the reader
interface, which is encrypted using K ′RC and is sent to C .
The card digitally signs this command and sends it back
to R. R encrypts the command using K ′RI , calculates its MAC
and sends it to I along with sigKprC (CMD,NR,NC ). This
signature and CMD are stored by the IMD and are required to
ensure non-repudiation, as already discussed in Section V-C.
The IMD responds with an answer encrypted by the same
session key, which is subsequently displayed on the reader
display. The session key expires in a manner similar to that in
the regular mode.
In offline mode, the user is only allowed paramedic-level
privileges, which have less access rights compared to a
technician (see Section II). The use of the OOB channel
makes it straightforward for the IMD to decide on granting
only paramedic-role commands.
VOLUME 8, 2020 147957
M. A. Siddiqi et al.: IMDfence: Architecting a Secure Protocol for IMDs
1) OFFLINE ACCESS WITH/WITHout NON-REPUDIATION
AND ACCESS CONTROL
We also propose a second flavor of the offline mode
in which non-repudiation and user authentication are not
a requirement. This is suitable for less critical implants,
such as neurostimulators. This flavor does not require a
smart card, and as a result we do not require the reader-
card- and user-authentication phases in addition to signature
generation. This improves usability, since the paramedic
is not required to perform reader-card authentication when
starting their duty. In this scheme, the touch-to-access
principle is deemed to be sufficient in order to ensure trust
establishment. It is important to note that, for IMDfence,
supporting non-repudiation during offline mode has to be
decided before IMD-system deployment since it cannot be
configured at runtime, so as to avoid exploitation.
2) OFFLINE ACCESS WITH/WITHout READER-INTERFACE
STANDARDIZATION
As indicated in Section II, supporting emergency access in the
field requires a standardized reader interface, which demands
collaboration between major IMD manufacturers. In order to
facilitate this multi-manufacturer environment (SR5), there
has to be one agreed-upon root CA that grants certificates to
the manufacturers, who can then act as intermediate CAs that
sign public keys of S, R and C . As things stand, however,
true emergency access does not exist in commercial IMDs. As
long as this remains an open issue, the above standardization
is not required, and as a result, IMDfence can be simplified by
eliminating the need for a global root CA. Emergency-access
support in IMDfence is intended to be there in anticipation of
any future changes in this regard.
E. SUMMARY OF PROTOCOL CONFIGURATIONS
The different configurations of IMDfence are highlighted
in Fig. 9. The dotted boxes indicate (fixed) pre-deployment
configurations, which cannot be changed at run-time. Such
configurations were discussed in Sections V-D1 and V-D2.
IMDfence is designed in such a way that an attacker
cannot target one mode over another for exploitation. For
instance, the offline mode is only triggered after an OOB
access, which is protected by the touch-to-access principle.
Moreover, the sub-modes of online access only come about
by disabling certain IMDfence steps instead of switching to
a totally independent behavior.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our system in terms of security
feasibility and also look into the handling of battery-DoS
protection for IMDs.
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS
1) AUTOMATIC VALIDATION USING AVISPA TOOL
For the automated and formal validation of IMDfence,
we used AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security
FIGURE 9. IMDfence configurations and use cases.
Protocols and Applications) [45]. Any protocol to be
validated using this tool is specified using the High-Level
Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL). An HLPSL spec-
ification consists of a description of the principals (i.e., R, I ,
C , S and the user in our case), security goals of the protocol,
and the details of the session(s) to be analyzed. AVISPA
integrates four back-end engines that provide different types
of automatic analysis of an HLPSL specification [45].
The tool helps in detecting vulnerabilities against Man-in-
the-middle and replay attacks. It also detects whether the
HLPSL specification is executable, i.e., all the specified
protocol states are traversable. Using AVISPA, we can also
optimize our protocols by removing certain parameters from
the messages in order to reduce communication overhead and
analyze if this results in a new vulnerability.
The analysis of IMDfence using AVISPA is summarized
in Table 3. The handshake-specific protocol requirements
(SR1, SR3, SR6 and SR7) are satisfied by specifying the
appropriate goals. In phase III, S extracts user privileges from
CertC after successful authentication of C , based on NS in
mSC2 . I then verifies S based on NI to complete the chain
from the card to the implant in order to ensure access control.
In order to check non-repudiation using the tool, the server
verifies that the retrieved sig from the IMD originated from
C during the session corresponding to NS .
TABLE 3. Summary of AVISPA analysis.
147958 VOLUME 8, 2020
M. A. Siddiqi et al.: IMDfence: Architecting a Secure Protocol for IMDs
2) READER-SPECIFIC ATTACKS
When considering all possible attack scenarios, we define the
following reader types:
1) Valid R (Rvalid ): This is a legitimate device, which is
not reported as stolen.
2) Stolen R (Rstolen):A legitimate device which is reported
as stolen.
3) Hacked R (Rhacked ): A stolen reader which is also
modified by A in order to e.g., replace the signature or
CMD.
4) Forged R (Rforged ): A custom-built or software-defined
radio used by A in order to communicate with an
implant. This reader does not have any pre-shared keys
with S.
The following scenarios are possible in terms of
user-reader combinations (which are also summarized
in Table 4):
TABLE 4. Enumeration of attack scenarios Sn in terms of user-reader
combinations.
S1 – Any user & Rvalid : This is the most common
scenario, which must be handled by IMDfence. A cannot
insert a false signature remotely (in order to frame someone)
since the connection between R and C is protected by
MAC-based integrity checks. Moreover, an insider attack
(from a legitimate, malicious user) should be detected by the
non-repudiation check. However, after sending a malicious
command, such a user can attempt multiple harmless write
commands in order to eventually overwrite the signature
corresponding to the malicious command. We term this as
the signature-overwrite attack. For each command, 72 bytes
of flash space is required to store the signature and the
associated session parameters. As an example, if a 32-kB
flash memory is allocated for signature storage, 456 attempts
will be required to successfully overwrite the targeted
signature, which is highly impractical. Even if the user
manages to achieve this, the signature record will still
point to an abnormally high number of write commands
corresponding to a single session, which will raise suspicions.
S2 – Any user or attacker & Rstolen: No individual will
be able to use Rstolen because of the checks involved in the
reader-card-authentication phase.
S3 – Trusted, honest user & Rhacked /Rforged : In order
to frame someone, A has to force the legitimate user to
use a hacked reader, which replaces the command with an
incorrect one. As a guideline, Rmust be issued from a trusted
repository, which rules out the use of Rhacked and Rforged for
trusted users.
S4 – Trusted, malicious user & Rhacked : Legitimate
malicious users can cover their tracks by using a hacked
reader that can replace the signature corresponding to a
malicious command, which is to be stored in the IMD, with
the one corresponding to a safe command. Such an attack is
quite costly to execute and is time-critical since it will involve
colluding with someone who has advanced engineering skills
while requiring that Rhacked is not reported as stolen. Since,
the user is considered trusted by the patient and can thus be in
close proximity, he/she has far easier and inexpensive means
to harm the patient without getting caught.
S5 – Trusted, malicious user & Rforged : Such a user
cannot send commands using a forged reader in an online
case since Rforged does not share a key with S. In the offline
case, however, such a user can use a forged reader that is
able to create a bogus sig and hence does not require any
involvement ofC . Moreover, he/she can use the OOB-pairing
interface because of being considered as trusted by the
patient. Similar to S4, such a scenario also requires hiring an
advanced attacker to develop such a reader, and based on the
touch-to-access assumption, the user has significantly easier
methods to harm the patient.
S6 – Attacker & Rvalid : For online access, the security
protocol will break if A gets hold of a valid reader, card and
its associated PIN, accesses the IMD from within the hospital
and during the user’s working hours, and C is not reported as
stolen. It is recommended that the user protects her card and
PIN, or immediately reports it in case it is lost. Moreover, as a
guideline, the user should never lend or sell R to a third party.
The protocol will also break if A gets hold of an OOB-paired
reader and a card with valid respective tokens, and knows
the PIN. We assume that the paramedic resets the pairing
after treatment. Overall,A cannot effectively launch the above
attacks since the likelihood of all the dependencies being true
is extremely low.
S7 – Attacker & Rhacked /Rforged : For online access, Awill
not be able to use Rhacked because of the reasons mentioned
in S6 above. Similarly, A cannot use Rforged since it does not
have a shared key with S. Moreover, for an offline scenario,
getting hold of these readers will not help an attacker A since
the main symmetric key (KRI ) comes from I in the OOB
pairing process. Hence, to gain advantage using these readers,
A would still need to get close to I (touch-to-access).
3) SMART-CARD-SPECIFIC ATTACKS
Since IMDfence employs smart cards, it is important to
ensure that it is safe from the weaknesses [13], [46] present
in another widely used smart-card system: EMV (Europay,
Mastercard, and Visa). These vulnerabilities exist due to the
availability of less secure options for backward compatibility
and due to a problematic threat model, in which the reader
(i.e., the POS terminal) is assumed to be uncorrupted.
One major issue is that most of the important data is
exchanged in plain-text (e.g., account data, amount etc.) since
the terminal and the card do not share a symmetric key.
Moreover, in the offline use of the cards that do not support
public-key cryptography, the PIN is also sent as plain-text. An
attacker can modify the unencrypted initialization messages
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to force the terminal to use this mode [13]. The PIN can
be recorded using e.g., a hacked terminal that has additional
probes to read data from the smart card interface. In case of an
offline-encrypted PIN, the terminal can be hacked to record
the keystrokes. Using the account data and PIN, the attacker
can create a magnetic-strip card for use in a country that does
not support chip-based smart cards [47].
Another issue is that the terminal cannot use MAC to
authenticate messages from the card since they do not
share a symmetric key. Cards following the Combined-
Data-Authentication (CDA) scheme from EMV address this
by employing signatures. However, in the schemes prior
to CDA, the terminal is unable to verify the authenticity
of all the card messages either due to unavailability of
signatures (in the case of Static Data Authentication, SDA)
or the signature-less transaction messages (in the case of
Dynamic Data Authentication, DDA). As a result, an SDA
card can be cloned for use in offline transactions [13],
and a stolen DDA card can be employed in a two-card
attack, in which the attacker uses his/her own card for
PIN verification and uses the stolen card in the transaction
phase [48]. Moreover, the card response at the end of PIN
verification is unauthenticated. As a result, this response can
be modified to deceive the terminal into assuming that the
entered PIN is correct.
All these attacks exist because in EMV some of the
critical data is left unencrypted or not signed. In contrast,
in both the online and offline modes of IMDfence, all data
between R and C is encrypted and is authenticated using
MACs. Additionally, our recommendation to avoidmagnetic-
strip-based cards rules out cloning. Similarly, avoiding
contactless cards removes an additional attack vector.
Another far more advanced type of attack is the relay
attack [46], [47], which exploits the fact that the card
users cannot know for sure if the display of the terminal
is showing correct information. It is a time-critical attack
where two transactions are simultaneously taking place. The
victim inserts his/her card in a counterfeit terminal (e.g., at a
restaurant), which is connected to a fake card of the attacker
that is inserted in a valid terminal (e.g. at a jewelry store).
The details of the fraudulent transaction are forwarded to the
victim’s terminal. Her screen shows the correct information,
but in effect she pays the amount for the other party.
We observe that the relay attack is far less likely in the case
of IMDfence since it requires a legitimate user operating a
forged reader. This corresponds to scenario S3 discussed in
Section VI-A2.
4) SELECTION OF T
The touch-to-access principle guarantees that an unreason-
ably high T (reader-card-authentication lifetime) value does
not cause a security vulnerability in IMDfence, as evident
from Section VI-A2. However, the careful reader may have
noticed that a prolonged offline operation enabled by such
a large value may result in R’s and/or IMD’s firmwares
becoming outdated. On the other hand, a very small
value hinders legitimate access, i.e., availability. Therefore,
the hospital server should ensure that T is assigned an
appropriate value (within maximum and minimum limits)
based on the patient’s location and the reader-IMD usage
patterns.
Regarding the patient’s locality, the probability of having
stable Internet connectivity is higher when the patient is
based in an urban area compared to a rural setting. Moreover,
it stands to reason that the chances of attacker presence
ought to be higher in an urban environment. Hence, it makes
sense to assign a lower T value for urban areas compared to
rural environments. When assigning the T value, reader-IMD
usage patterns should also be taken into consideration, which
depend on the patient condition and IMD type, ranging from
critical implants, such as cardiac defibrillators, to less critical
ones, such as neurostimulators. The IMDs requiring frequent
reader access should be granted a larger T value. Further
investigation on this topic is interesting but is considered
outside the scope of this work.
It should be noted that the (re)setting of T can be performed
throughout the operational lifetime of the IMD. The physician
is required to manually modify this parameter (in S) based on
the above guidelines, which then ultimately take effect in the
reader-card authentication phase (see Fig. 3).
B. AVAILABILITY – DoS PROTECTION
As highlighted in Section II, one of the system requirements
is to ensure that the IMD is always available for treat-
ment. One high-likelihood and low-cost attack that affects
this requirement is the battery-DoS attack, as practically
demonstrated in [3], [4]. This attack forces the IMD
to continuously run energy-consuming operations, which
results in battery depletion and ultimately causes device
shutdown. For example, the attacker can repeatedly try
to establish a connection with the implant using incorrect
credentials. The IMD will scrutinize each invalid request
through energy-consuming authentication operations, which
will drain its battery despite failing to authenticate properly.
The IMD can defend against battery DoS by employing
a zero-power defense (ZPD) scheme in which the authen-
tication operation is executed using borrowed energy [3].
This energy can be harvested from the incoming RF
communication messages from the external reader. The IMD
switches to battery power only after it has successfully
authenticated the external entity.
Another type of DoS attack can occur when the attacker
sends repeated communication requests to the implant. For
an IMD with a single-processor, such requests may block
the device from performing its primary medical functionality.
To protect against this, a dual-CPU paradigm can be
employed, in which the first CPU executes the original
medical functionality, while the second CPU is responsible
for dealing with the (secure) communication requests.
This dual-core organization offers, then, both functional
and power decoupling, which effectively shields the IMD
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main functionality from battery-DoS attacks, as previously
showcased in [12].
In order to assess the viability of IMDfence under
energy-harvesting conditions (be it in single- or dual-CPU
configuration), we construct the following experimental
setup:
(I) Computational costs: Similarly to [49], we employ
an ARM Cortex-M0+ based 32-bit MCU [50]. Due to its
ultra-low-power capabilities, and the on-board hardware-
accelerated, security building blocks (i.e., encryption, MAC,
hash function, random-number generator etc.), this MCU
is becoming increasingly employed in IoT and WBAN
settings [51], and hence, is a plausible choice for this
evaluation. The security-related computations, i.e., authen-
ticated encryption (AES-128), cipher-based MAC and
random-number generation were performed using theMCU’s
dedicated peripherals (‘‘CRYPTO’’ and ‘‘TRNG’’); thus,
in our energymeasurements, hardware-accelerated primitives
are considered. However, as a reference, we also include a
software-only MCU implementation of IMDfence.
(II) Wireless-communication costs: Commercial trans-
ceiver ZL70103 specifically designed for IMDs has been
used [52]. To get reasonable energy costs for (encrypted)
data transmission, we chose packet-size lengths similar to
the ones used in low-cost RFID tags, due to their similarities
with IMDs in terms of computational, memory and energy
constraints [12]. Hence N , ID, CMD and ANS were set to
32, 96, 32 and 64 bits, respectively. The sig size was set at
384 bits, which corresponds to an ECDSA (Elliptic-Curve
Digital-Signature Algorithm) signature with a 96-bit security
level.
FIGURE 10. IMD energy consumption and performance per
IMDfence-protocol step while using hardware-accelerated security
primitives.
The protocol sequence executed by the IMD is shown
as numbered steps in Figures 5 and 6. In the case of
hardware-accelerated primitives, the energy consumption
for these steps is shown in Fig. 10 using a supply
voltage of 3.3 V, and the default MCU and transceiver
clock frequencies of 19 MHz and 24 MHz, respectively.
The transceiver data rate is set at 400 kbps (with an effective
rate of 265 kbps). We observe that the energy required
for authentication (Eauth), i.e., for steps 1 to 4 in Fig. 5,
is only 59.6 µJ. In the case of software implementation,
however, Eauth is only 119.4 µJ, as shown in Fig. 11. For
such a low harvested-energy requirement (Eauth), it has been
demonstrated before in [49] that real-time performance is
possible in the IMD with or without hardware acceleration.
Total IMD energy consumption per type of activity is also
shown Fig. 12.
FIGURE 11. IMD energy consumption and performance per
IMDfence-protocol step when implementing the security primitives in
software.
FIGURE 12. IMD energy consumption per IMDfence-protocol activity.
C. IMD LIFETIME
In the previous section, we discussed the feasibility of
IMDfence under energy-harvesting conditions to defend
against battery-DoS attacks. In this section, we wish to assess
the total energy costs that the IMDfence protocol incurs over
the whole lifetime of a modern IMD. To do so, we need
to consider realistic usage patterns of actual devices, drawn
frommedical practice. There are two prominent IMD classes:
neurostimulators and cardiac implants. Neurostimulators
typically consume more power than cardiac devices [53]
and, therefore, often come with rechargeable batteries which
would pose no challenge for IMDfence. Cardiac implants,
on the other hand, are not rechargeable due to their critical
nature [49], and represent more pessimistic devices to
assess IMDfence against. Thus, for our evaluation here,
we consider a communication session between a pacemaker
and a commercial bedside reader (Merlin@homeTM) [22].
We consider different data volumes being transferred
between the reader and IMD, ranging from a daily two-
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minute5 communication session to a two-minute weekly
session. Since this reader is intended for monitoring the IMD
status, it is assumed that most of the communicated data
is transferred from the implant to the reader (e.g., in the
form of data logs). Hence, the size of ANS is increased from
64 bits (for a basic session) to roughly 3 MB in order to
form a two-minute session. However, for worst-case analysis,
the transceiver is considered to be enabled throughout this
session and we do not assume the use of energy harvesting
for ZPD. Moreover, without loss of generality and in order
to more accurately (and pessimistically) quantify the cost
of adding IMDfence to an existing system, we consider a
dual-CPU IMD, as discussed in the previous section. In this
configuration, the security CPU is assumed to execute the
complete IMDfence protocol, while the medical CPU is set
to a 5% duty cycle (active vs. sleep mode), based on typical
pacemaker usage [54], and consumes 20 µJ per heartbeat
to provide electrical-stimulation impulses, based on reported
figures of commercial devices [55].
FIGURE 13. IMD-battery lifetime with respect to cryptographic primitive
used. Boxplot variation is due to different data-transfer volumes.
With the above consideration, the impact of IMDfence
on IMD-battery lifetime can be visualized using Fig. 13 for
different implantable-grade battery sizes [56]. The variability
in each data point captures the different volumes of data
transfer between the reader and IMD.
Since the majority of the cryptographic operations in the
protocol (authenticated encryption and MAC) are based on
symmetric block ciphers, as shown in Figures 5 and 6,
it is very interesting to investigate the impact of different
cipher versions and/or implementations thereof on IMD
lifetime, e.g., a pacemaker. More box plots have, thus, been
added to Fig. 13, where we readily notice that the hardware
implementation of AES-128 significantly outperforms the
software AES-128 implementation, plus other lightweight
software ciphers such as SPECK and MISTY1. It is also
interesting to observe that the energy impact of the hardware
5This corresponds to an unencrypted session. An equivalent secure session
(by employing IMDfence) will take longer than two minutes due to the
additional data transferred.
AES-128-based protocol is not significant when comparing
with an unsecured communication.
D. IMD PERFORMANCE
To study the impact of IMDfence on performance during
normal operation, we will only analyze the bottleneck of
the reader-IMD system in this regard, i.e., the IMD itself.
This is because modern readers, such as tablets [17], have
far superior computational resources (and battery autonomy)
than implants. As far as the smart card is concerned,
the amount of computations performed by it is approximately
the same as that in commercial uses (e.g., EMV), which we
know to exhibit adequate performance.
As far as the IMD is concerned, the performance figure of
merit that is crucial to capture here is the delay that IMDfence
incurs to the system, both for security computations and
data transmission over the air. For unsecured data transfer,
the wireless transceiver incurs a delay of 2.2 ms. As shown
in Fig. 10, for (hardware-accelerated) secure data transfer the
time delay incurred by each (numbered) protocol step is no
higher than 6 ms, for a total protocol delay of 15.7 ms. There-
fore, for the time scales involved in biological processes,
we can safely assume that the IMDfence delay overhead is
negligible.
TABLE 5. Summary of costs for running the IMDfence protocol on an IMD.
E. SUMMARY OF INTRODUCED OVERHEADS
Table 5 summarizes the impact of IMDfence on an IMD
in terms of energy, performance and program-memory
footprint. For the hardware implementation of IMDfence,
it can be observed that, although the energy requirements
increase by more than 6 times for a basic session, the total
daily IMD consumption (that includes a two-minute com-
munication session and electrical-stimulation costs) increases
from 16.60 J to just 17.69 J, which amounts to a mere
6.57% increase, as previously shown in Fig. 13. The
reason for this small increase is that the basic medical
functionality, e.g., the continuous electrical stimulation of
a pacemaker, dominates the security provisions since the
reader accesses are far less frequent. In the case of software
(AES-128) implementation of IMDfence, the total daily IMD
consumption increases by 19.82% (as shown in Fig. 13).
Moreover, there is a minimal increase in the computational
delay and required program-memory size. In the context
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of current MCU technology, 8.22–10.48 kB of additional
memory size is negligible. Hence, we conclude that there is
no noticeable change in the IMD costs when IMDfence is
employed.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel security protocol
for IMD ecosystems, IMDfence. We have demonstrated
that our approach offers a meticulous coverage of security
requirements that are critical to these systems. This becomes
possible through the use of a personal smart card and a trusted
third party, which helps in facilitating access control, non-
repudiation, user authentication, bedside-reader operation
and system scalability. We have also shown that IMDfence
does not introduce any noticeable overheads in the implant,
and it has the ability to support zero-power defense against
battery-DoS attacks. It is observed that our proposed protocol
increases the total IMD energy consumption by just 6.57%,
which is minimal in the context of the IMD lifespan. We have
also proposed an OOB-channel-based version of IMDfence,
which enables offline or emergency access.
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